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Reframing narratives of peace- and statebuilding in Africa: 
A case study of Rwanda 
Introduction 
This baseline study examines the trajectory of Rwanda’s statebuilding 
experience. It examines the nature of the conversations that occurred in this 
process and what aspects of these produced violent conflict and to what extent 
the peace settlement addressed the root causes of violence. In particular, it 
assesses the type of identity issues that underlined the state building 
conversations and the extent to which, the settlement dealt with these identity 
issues. We therefore examine Rwanda’s civil war that lasted from 1990-1994 
and the genocide of 1994 from a historical perspective, tracing its root causes to 
the conversations surrounding the creation of the state of Rwanda and we 
discuss the settlement process to see the extent to which it deals with those root 
cause factors.  
 
We argue in this paper that an examination of Rwanda over a period dating back 
from pre-colonial times until the 1994 genocide reveals that Identity and 
reconstruction of “ideas of identity” are at the core of Rwanda’s nation- and 
statebuilding conversation. Those in conversation as well as the conversible 
spaces mutated across periods of Rwanda’s history, starting from the pre-
colonial period to the post-genocide phase. The identity conversation invariably 
underpinned other areas of Rwandan society and the emergent state, with 
certain identity forms and issues more dominant in the nation- and state 
building conversations than others.  
 
Rwanda’s historical trajectory in relation to the statebuilding 
conversations that pre-dated war and genocide  
 
Identity in Rwanda’s statebuilding conversation: pre-colonial origins 
In pre-colonial Rwanda, the terms Tutsi, Hutu and Twa represented something 
radically different from what the world knew it to be in the period during and 
after the 1994 genocide. The concept of identity was vague and changed its 
meaning depending on the ruler. Various scholars on Rwanda now generally 
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agree that pre-colonial Rwandan society was organized around family, clans, and 
social class categories. Before the arrival of Germans and Belgians, the labels of 
Hutus, Tutsi and Twa were attached to what class a person belonged to and there 
are plenty of instances of migration from one group to another through inter 
marriage or a ruler’s decision. In the pre-colonial era, family and clan 
associations were more important than being ‘Hutu’ or ‘Twa’; and 
Hutus/Tutsi/Twa could co-exist in any one clan. Thus conversations of one’s 
identity affiliation and belonging were more fixed on their clans than their 
Hutu/Tutsi and Twa identity.  
 
Newbury indicates that Hutu, Tutsi and Twa “were old terms, but their meanings 
and significance and the political significance of membership in them changed 
significantly over time” (Newbury, 10). These terms were used to represent 
socio-economic classes rather than distinct ethnic groupings. Tutsi denoted 
those with wealth (10% of the society), Hutu those who worked for the wealthy 
Tutsi (86% of the population) and Twa (1%) those at the lowest ebb of the social 
strata (Newbury, 11).1 As Newbury argues, the pre-colonial Rwandan society 
was flexible as one could change from being Hutu and Twa to become Tutsi when 
your wealth increased. This change could happen if a Hutu or Twa acquired more 
than ten cattle, or if favored by the King and given a Tutsi bride. The reverse was 
also true, as a Tutsi who lost cattle or lost favor with the King could become a 
Hutu or Twa. This change in status was called kwihutura literally meaning one 
has become a Tutsi. Conversely, the term Kwitutsura explains downward 
mobility; a term used when one lost cattle or married into and became part of a 
poor Hutu family.  
 
Newbury asserts that during Tutsi leadership, “advantages of being Tutsi and the 
disadvantages of being Hutu increased enormously” (ibid). She argues that these 
terms could not be described as a “caste” system as this invokes a kind of “rigid 
hierarchy” which was not the case.  There was no religious ideology, or any 
economic occupation that distinguished Hutu and Tutsi. Both Hutus and Tutsis 
                                                 
1 These statistics advanced by colonialist though these numbers can be disputed by the fact that in post-
independence Rwanda there are many inter-marriages.  
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owned cattle, and tilled land as part of their economic activities (ibid, 12). 
However with arrival of the Belgians, physical traits were associated to Hutu and 
Tutsi terms as social classifications and established them as ethnic identities 
(Gasanabo, 2006, 367). 
 Unlike typical ethnic arrangements, which were more rigid, there was mobility 
upward [or downward] these socio-economic classes: Hutu or Twa could 
become Tutsi if they acquired more wealth; and that status could be conferred at 
the will of the [Tutsi] monarch.  
 
In this period, elites, the King, his advisors and other noble men ‘chiefs’ and 
military commanders, etc managed conversations. Although women did not hold 
official political power, the queen mother was extremely influential on matters of 
leadership and governance and could contradict even top advisors or disrupt the 
political culture. For example, the Queen Mother Kanjogera who was from Abega 
clan was known to be influential in political leadership in 1896, and plotted a 
coup d’ Etat over King Rutalindwa. King Kigeli IV had appointed Rutalindwa 
before his son as his first child from another queen mother. However, Kanjogera 
wanted her son Musinga to rule. Kanjogera’s army won over that of Rutalindwa. 
They were all Tutsis but the two queen mothers were from different clans. Other 
queen mothers that followed were influential in political matters, owned land 
and cattle but not in such a visible role.2 They forced conversations on political 
issues and on Kingdom structures informally. Thus we cannot completely 
disregard them as actors as their actions determined a new course for the 
country.  Kanjogera’s actions were selfish but nevertheless showed how 
important women were as actors. 
 
Political leadership changed over different centuries and took different forms 
depending on the different regions of Rwanda. For example, while different clans 
had a King and a Kingdom in the East and West, and were all conquered by the 
Nyiginya central Kingdom, the Northern society was still led by the chiefs of 
families and was never conquered by the central Kingdom. Whenever these 
                                                 
2 Newbury 1988, 57-59 as well as Learthen Dorsey, 1994, 345, both discuss the importance and role 
played by “Umugabekazi” or queen mother.  
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conversations turned violent, it did not tend to be among elites and the ordinary 
citizens, rather it was between an army from one Kingdom against another, to 
redefine borders of the central Kingdom that became Rwanda. We now know 
through proverbs and folk-tales that violence also occurred at a more localised 
and intra-family level (as happens within any society) but this was not 
necessarily caused by social, personal and ethnic differences. 
 
Social and political identity in pre-colonial Rwanda was organized through 
family, lineages, clans and a mixture of other complex factors that indicated 
social and political belonging. Institutions, governance, and administration issues 
illustrate how sophisticated kingdoms structured identities. Rwanda was not 
only organized into kingdoms, but it was also structured in micro decentralized 
levels of governance. This system facilitated the channeling of information about 
cultural practices and economic activities among various members across social 
strata. Some of the institutions Newbury discusses include, three micro 
institutions Inzu, Ubwoko, Umulyango, Ibihugu. Inzu (families); this represented 
the smallest unit of every part of society. It included family members who could 
trace their relationship back approximately five generations, which was decided 
by identifying their family lineages. Ubwoko (clan); was a larger group of 
belonging than inzu, and perhaps the most significant grouping. It was made of a 
group of people who could trace their relationship to a common ancestor and 
was mapped through spoken tales. The clans were geographically dispersed due 
to various waves of immigration (Maquet, 33). 
 
The system of governance that consisted of a household or Inzu, Umurynago, 
Urugo, Umusozi (the hill) was governed by kingdom laws. There were kingdoms 
in Rwanda, dominated by various identity groups in different regions in the 
South and North such as those of Nkore, Karagwe, and Ndorwa that emerged in 
earlier centuries (Vansina, 1961, 63). Every new group that migrated in earlier 
centuries (between the twelfth and eighteenth centuries) conquered and 
established a new political authority. Contrary to popular belief that only Tutsis 
were Kings or that the Nyiginya dynasty always occupied the throne, some 
historians observed that there were kingdoms, particularly in the North, that 
Comment [J1]:  
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remained independent since the twelfth century (Lacger, 1959, 88). It was not 
until the late nineteenth century that Nyinginya kingdom under Rwabugiri 
conquered the Northern kingdoms with the assistance of colonialists 
(Kamukama, 1993, 9). King Rwabugiri was well known in popular narratives for 
his conquests of fighting foreigners and expanding the Kingdom of Central 
Rwanda to include Kingdoms from other regions. The period between 1860 and 
1895 was the final and largest expansion of the boundaries of the Nyinginya 
Kingdom before the Germans colonized the area (Mamdani, 2001: 69). 
 
The Kingdom structure included the administration of resources and tax 
collections. These structures have been referred to acting as clientship systems 
important to the Rwandan State. The issue of clientship is probably the most 
controversial topic in the history of pre-colonial Rwanda. Some of the earlier 
scholars interpret this as a system of oppression between the King’s Tutsi 
lineage oppressing Hutus who were the poor and majority of the populace. The 
relationship between Umugaragu (the worker) and the Shebuja (the land owner 
or patron) was played out and presented in Western terms as feudalism that was 
then prevailing in Europe.  
 
Another school of thought that includes scholars in post-independent Rwanda 
disagrees. They present this system as a form of taxes where there was an 
agreement between the Umugaragua and Shebuja (Newbury, 3). This remains 
one of the oldest unresolved contentions among scholars, despite it being the 
anchoring myth that is later held accountable as the cause of conflicts. This 
system is famously referred to as Ubuhake. The two schools of thought disagree 
on whether or not a “contract” or “agreement” was reached between the two 
parties. Sensitive speculations exist as to whether this relationship existed only 
between a Tutsi chief or King and his subjects - the Hutu - or among Tutsis and 
among Hutus3. From analyzing various arguments, what seems clear is that there 
was a system of taxes, like in other kingdoms or even the modern State that 
changed meaning when colonialists occupied Rwanda. This system also evolved 
to assume different social functions and definitions in society as the dynamics of 
                                                 
3  See Newbury “Cohesion of oppression” 1988:30-33 
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power between groups also shifted meaning. Therefore, before colonialism the 
Rwandan kingdom had rulers, institutions, and respected land laws, and a tax 
system that was followed.  
 
Thus, prior to colonization, the difference between groups and the institutions 
that made up Rwanda kingdoms was not based on biological, environmental, or 
of any scientific nature, but a social hierarchy that could be scaled. The colonial 
administration found a well-organized society with features that resembled 
those of the modern state. Given the Kingdoms complex structure, the European 
colonialists resorted to dividing the society into different races, ethnic identities 
and preferential treatment of one category against another in order to control 
the land and its population. 
 
Evolution and use of identity in colonial Rwanda 
 
The Germans arrived in Ruanda and Urundi, as it was then known, as part of 
their exploration of East Africa. However, as a result of Germany’s defeat in 
World War I, it lost all its colonies. Belgium, being the closest colonial power in 
Congo, assumed the Ruanda-Urundi territories under a trusteeship permitted by 
the League of Nations. As the following analysis demonstrates it was Belgium, 
who through a system of divide and rule in order to prop and sustain their 
colonial project, reconfigured identity from how it was previously known.  
 
When Belgium took control, it made a pledge to The League of Nations that it 
would promote development, freedom of speech and religion in Rwanda. 
However, beginning in 1923, Belgium administrators gradually eroded the 
powers of King Musinga to appoint chiefs for political leadership positions 
(Malvern, 2000:10). By 1931 the Belgian administration had replaced King 
Musinga. This was in an effort to modernize Rwanda; a process which seemingly 
had been slowed down when the King refused to adopt Christianity. He was 
deposed and replaced with one of his more compliant sons, Mutara Rudahigwa 




Colonialists sought to interpret the relationships among Rwandans according to 
their political needs. In their early interactions with Rwandans, Germans tried to 
accept the conversation tone set by the Kingdom but the conversations among 
Rwandans were too coded, fluid and not clearly defined as their Flemish and 
Wallon categorizations. Thus the Belgians plotted against the King and 
introduced new systems that would allow them to see a Rwandan society they 
could define, understand and therefore manage the types of conversations that 
would take place in society. During their reign, they introduced a new form of 
identity - that of Christian identity that Rwandans initially resisted because there 
was already a unifying religion of Ryangombe and a concept of Imana that was 
universally recognised by Rwandans.  
However, for Belgians to decode these conversations and disrupt them, they 
reconfigured the spaces where these conversations took place. Thus Rwandan 
sites of knowledge and discussions were disvalued. These included: 
 
i. The evening gatherings in homes or occasionally in the King’s palace 
where parables, new songs, proverbs and other discourses on identity 
were formulated  
ii. The gathering in communities to pray Ryangombe and Guterekera (to 
give offerings to their gods) 
iii. Gathering to Dance, to play ‘igisoro’, play the drum, sing for cows etc  
iv. Use of the Kinyarwanda language through comedy and art, as symbols of 
non-verbal conversations   
v. The secrets around the Kingdom that allowed certain conversations to 
remain confidential to a small elite  
These sites and conversation were replaced by: 
i. The Sunday mass which was introduced especially with the arrival of 
white fathers who (as documented in paper 1 and 2) were very 
influential in shaping what terms of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa came to 
mean 
ii. The colonial spaces also included the formal education/schools system 
that glorified learning in this form and sought to give official authority 
to a new elite who would also set a tone on conversations. The new 
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elite would formulate new questions on who Rwandans were using 
colonial methods and an understanding that was more controllable 
and less fluid than their ancestors definitions 
iii. The introduction of Eurocentric political organization that discredited the 
Kingdom structure and secrecy around the Kingdom. This was done 
through, for example, the introduction of Republics, minsters, local 
administration and national administration etc. 
iv. Replacing the role of queen mother in society and therefore introducing a 
male dominated model of government that excluded women and the 
promoted few of the poor to elite status.  
It is within these reconfigurations of society that an accelerated shift took place 
on what kind of conversations were taking place on identity, how those 
conversations happened, where they happened, who managed them and how 
they affected all aspects of life aspects for Rwandan society. 
 
It was also during this process that conversations turned violent in 1959 
amongst the old and the new elites. The old elites were Tutsi who had been 
cheated by Belgians. At their initial engagement with Rwanda, Belgians and 
white fathers had portrayed Tutsis as the most knowledgeable and therefore 
equal partners for political and economic power. But as the movements of 
decolonization were evolving in different African countries, Belgians switched 
support to forming a new Hutu elite that would control the majority. Thus, the 
shift in 1959 was crucial in politicizing conversations on identity among 
Rwandans. The Belgians had already attempted to fix these identities by carrying 
out scientific studies and introducing identity cards for Hutus, Tutsi and Twa. 
 
The Belgians introduced radical changes, establishing their administration with 
cooperation of select chiefs, and imprisoning anyone who opposed their rule 
(ibid). It was also during this period that the Belgians turned what was a tax law 
into slavery. The Nyiginya chiefs who had cooperated were handed more power, 
and thus subsequently progressively removing power from the hands of the 
Hutu, this included the loss of power in what was previously the free Northern 
Kingdoms. The entire population, with the exception of the Royal family and 
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Europeans, was subjected to a form of Ubuhake, or Uburetwa, a system of forced 
hard labor heavily despised by the population (Prunier, 27).  
 
Belgium’s invention of races was given visibility in the work of Jean Jacque 
Maquet, where race ideologies were presented as scholarly analysis. In 
particular the title of his book The Premise of Inequality in Rwanda (1961), 
emphasised inequalities and as one of the early scholars to write on Rwandan 
identity, attempted to map out the differences in Rwandan identity by looking 
for inequalities in the population themselves. Maquet’s two-year field research 
involved informal interviews with missionaries, European administrators and 
Africans. In this research he focused on the political organization of Rwandan 
society at the point of their contact with European cultures around 1910.  
Maquet started his book by outlining Rwandans’ manners, food, religious 
practices, systems of governance and the different groups of identities that 
existed in the period before European invasion. Based on his observation, he 
distinguished Tutsis to have been powerful lords who governed over the 
majority poor Hutus and protected the weak in public through the country. He 
interpreted Ubuhake, comparable to the modern day tax system, as a feudal 
system that was also being practiced in Europe at the time (Maquet, 141). 
Maquet described the Tutsis as the wealthy “who do not have to participate in 
the manual labor of economic production by the moderate and clever 
exploitation of the majority” (ibid). Due to natural, biological and cultural factors, 
Maquet claimed that anyone born Tutsi were pre-destined to become oppressors 
of the Hutu population (ibid, 143). Maquet claimed the Tutsi, which he declared 
an “ethnic group”, consisted of those who inhabited Rwanda during the third 
wave of immigration and who imposed their political region on the Hutu and 
Twa population that already occupied the territory. He calculated that the Tutsi 
group comprised of ten to fifteen percent of the population at the time of his 
study.   
 
Despite such claims he provided no statistical data to support this statement. He 
pointed out that the ethnic identities of Tutsi, Hutu and Twa could be 
distinguished in terms of difference in their physical appearances and using 
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these so-called physical differences assigned a social hierarchy. Like the Catholic 
clergy, a Swiss national Leon Class, he identified Tutsis, as those taller, slender 
and lighter. According to Maquet they were the only ones who could become 
Kings and thus their relations with Hutus and Twa were based on oppression 
and subjection. He held that Hutus were short, darker, less intelligent and born 
to be slaves for Tutsis. To Maquet the Twa ranked the lowest on his list, he 
described them as “ape-like” (ibid, 146) and a less important population only 
useful to slave for both the Tutsis and surprisingly even for the Hutus. He 
concluded that Rwanda was in a social vacuum void of borders and with a 
history marked by ethnic conflicts between Hutus and Tutsis. 
  
Maquet’s studies supported the Belgians’ attempt to employ divide and rule 
techniques to govern Rwanda (African rights, 1995, 7). In an effort to both 
maintain power and divide the Rwandan and Burundian population the Belgians 
employed every system possible. This was eventually accomplished through the 
employment of scientific theories that at the time predominated in Europe and 
the United States. These theories were used to create differences between the 
Hutus, Tutsis and Twa as per Maquet’s analysis. The differences were then 
institutionalized through the distribution of identity cards that defined one’s 
“ethnic identity”. Regarded as empirical knowledge, these scientific theories 
were followed and employed through a socialization process of teaching a 
certain history in the European education system that had been implemented in 
Rwanda for the Rwandan social classes. Myths were created and used in popular 
culture to reinforce the ethnic categories. The long term process that took 
decades to implement was successful in dividing Rwandans, creating ideas about 
the “other”, which would become such a prominent feature in the 1994 genocide. 
In order to understand the origin of this racist project that would result in a 
divided Rwanda in the twentieth century, it is important to examine critically the 
roots of categorization and classification of the human race.  
 
The role of Race Theory 
The tools used to measure the nose and skin color, the study of skulls, and 
theories of the effect of environment in creating differences were not unique to 
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Rwanda as Maquet had shown. These ideas of inequality in humans had 
dominated the European and American eighteenth and nineteenth Century 
debates on the origin of human beings and their differences or similarities of 
their “race.”  
 
Following the 1735 study “Systema naturale” by the Swedish Carl Linnaeus 
which concentrated on classifying humans into different racial groups, 
alternative schools developed around what created the different categories 
(Stanton, 3). One school of thought sought to demonstrate that physical 
differences were a result of the environment. Reverend Dr. Samuel Stanhope 
Smith, a professor of moral philosophy at Princeton, New Jersey, for example, 
suggested exposure to the sun, or lack thereof, could determine and change skin 
colour (Stanton, 6-8). Such ‘unity of man’ arguments were put forward to 
discourage racist practices such as slavery (Stanton 11, 12). 
 
Other scientists using craniometry to establish that essential differences and 
natural inequality existed among human populations critiqued these arguments, 
however. Studies of the physical attributes of different races through skull and 
body measurements claimed to expose a natural hierarchy amongst them with 
Caucasians justifiably dominant (Stanton; 16). In his Account of the Regular 
Gradation in Man (1799) the English surgeon Charles White (1728-1813) made 
one of the earliest claims that whites were naturally superior to any other races. 
He noted:  
 
Where else shall we find that nobly arched head contained such a quantity of 
brain…? Where that variety of features, and fullness of expression; those 
long, flowing, graceful ring lets; that majestic beard, those rosy cheeks and 
coral lips? Where that… noble gait? In what other quota of the globe shall 
we find the blush that overspreads the soft features of the beautiful women 
of Europe, that emblem of modesty, of delicate feelings…? Where, except on 
the bosom of the European woman, two such plump and snowy white 




Obsessions with facial features and angles emerged, such as the Dutch anatomist 
Pieter Camper (1722-89) determining different races possessed 
“dolichocephalic” (long-headed) and “brachycephalic” (broad-headed) features. 
A century later, Europeans would apply these ideas to distinguish the Abatutsi 
and Abahima of Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda. Germans, as well as Belgian 
colonialists, arrived in Rwanda with the belief that civilization did not exist 
anywhere in Africa and that whites were naturally superior.  
 
They were surprised, however, that social structures, laws that governed the 
land, a King with an administration and men and women who played a role in 
local politics actually existed. The colonialist’s education had socialized them to 
believe that there was no commonality amongst different races. This scientific 
racism of nineteenth and twentieth century’s was manufactured by elites in 
European universities, distributed through research journals and popularized 
through newspaper articles, and convinced colonisers that whites were the 
superior race with a responsibility to socialize, educate, govern, and inevitably 
rein as superior moral beings above Africans and the non-white others.  
 
In order to successfully rule, theories were produced to define, stratify and 
classify Rwandans (African Rights; 5), which fit perfectly with the previously 
noted racial beliefs of the colonists. Priests and explorers as well as 
administrators who came in contact with Rwandans expressed extreme surprise 
at what appeared to them as sharp physical distinctions among Rwandans; some 
were very tall and others were short. Unlike what was done with Congo’s diverse 
population the colonists could not use different language to justify defining and 
categorizing different ethnicities. As illustrated above, there was no difference in 
either the language spoken or cultural practices amongst groups in Rwanda. 
Hence, as a desperate attempt to understand the society through European 
lenses, they insisted on employing the predominant racial theories to define and 
classify Rwandans. 
 
A theory on migration was devised which fit this ideology. Explorer-missionary 
John Hanning Speke in the late nineteenth century developed what was to be 
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called the “Hamitic hypothesis” which held that all forms of civilization in 
“nigroid” Africa – including the tall people who he referred to as “Tutsi”, the term 
that had been used to describe the wealthy - were brought there by the “Hamitic” 
race, the lowest branch of the Aryan or Caucasoid race. This theory held that 
Hamitic people were originally descended from the son of Noah and originated 
in Ethiopia (John Speke, 247). Speke produced a chronology of how the Hamitic 
people traversed South through Somali and beyond encountering different 
groups, crossed the Nile, forgot their original group names and religion and 
eventually discovered the rich pasture-lands of Unyoro, where they “founded the 
great kingdom of Kittara”(ibid).   
 
The Hamitic theory was later advanced by race theorist Giuseppe Sergi who 
classified the “Tutsi” as being from the Eastern Branch of Africa together with the 
Maasai in Kenya and Tanzania, and the Galla of Somalia (Sergi, 41). Seligman’s 
The races of Africa (1930) asserted “that all civilization in Africa was to be 
credited to the Hamites” who were basically superior pastoral Europeans who 
arrived “better armed as well as quicker witted than the dark agricultural 
Negroes” (Seligman, 35). 
 
There were contentions as to where the Tutsi had originally come from,4 but 
other explorers such as Sir Samuel Bakerm, Gaetano Casati, and the twentieth 
century catholic fathers such as Father Van den Burgt, Father Gorju and John 
Roscoe, all supported the Hamitic migration argument that they originated in the 
North of Africa, closer to Europe. Hutu extremists developed these theories in 
post independence era. They argued that Tutsis were foreigners from Ethiopia 
who invaded Rwanda and enslaved Hutus.     
It is worth noting that statements at the time continued to be issued about the 
“Tutsi” as compared to the “Hutu,” with little regard for the Twa. Bishop Le Roy’s 
observation was typical of the time and backed by the other clergy present in 
Rwanda: 
 
                                                 
4
  A member of the Catholic clergy Father Page asserted the Tutsis were descendants of the ancient 
Egyptians, whereas De Lacger an early colonial historian on Rwanda argued they came from 
Melanesia, for example. 
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The Bahima (a Tutsi clan) differ absolutely by the beauty of their features 
and their light color from the Bantu agriculturalists of an inferior type. Tall 
and well-proportioned, they have long thin noses, a wide brow and fine lips. 
They say they came from the North. Their intelligent and delicate 
appearance, their love of money, their capacity to adapt to any situation 
seems to indicate a Semitic-origin (Prunier, 6). 
 
The Belgian Christian missionaries’ were well-respected in Europe and their 
words and work carried a lot of weight. They were the de facto anthropologists 
who studied Rwandans and Belgian administrators often relied on their 
observations and took them as factual. Their analysis of Rwandan society was 
heavily influenced by their ‘knowledge’ of human classification held before 
arriving in Ruanda-Urundi. Their beliefs allowed them to reinforce a logic which 
confirmed that the Negros, wherever they are, were inferior to the Caucasian and 
their descendants.   
 
With an increasing obsession with human classifications, like their predecessors 
European scientists came to conduct research in Ruanda-Urundi, studying the 
local’s skulls and employing the same scientific methods to establish empirical 
differences among “Tutsi” and “Hutu” identities.  Armed with tools that had been 
used in laboratories around the world to differentiate the Negro from the 
Caucasian and the Indians, their ‘scientific’ knowledge  could justify certain 
political, economic, and social policies that favored one group given their “God 
given abilities” to rule. 
 
In their conclusions, the colonialists ignored the complex and fluid identities and 
social structures existing in pre-colonial Rwanda that allowed an individual or 
family to change from their Hutu or Tutsi social status. As the important factor of 
intermarriages, which had been predominant in Rwandan society, was ignored 
some families were assigned an incorrect identity. At times even two households 
of the same inzu, ubwoko, umuryango were divided into different ethnic groups. 
This meant that it was possible to have children who were both Hutu and Tutsi 




Hamitic theory was contested and discredited in the 1950s by scholars 
originating from former colonized countries or African descendants in America. 
Two remarkable contributions were made by Cheikh Anta Diop, from continental 
Africa and W. E. B. Du Bois, an African American scholar, who exposed the 
underpinnings of the Hamitic theory in their studies of pre-colonial history and 
history of East Africa. Diop and Du Bois challenged the race notions that denied 
attributes to the civilization of African peoples in pre-colonial society (Rigby, 
1996, 66). However, these ideologies had been so entrenched to the point that 
even the Maasai or the Bahima perceived themselves as Caucasoids related to 
the Dinka, and Nuer. 
 
The Rwandan social fabric was completely destroyed by the Belgians who, using 
racial pseudo-scientific arguments that were prevailing in nineteenth and 
twentieth century Europe and the United States, embarked on a research study 
in Astrida. It is this research that paved way for European theorists to write 
books that supported their arguments that the Hutu, Tutsi, Twa were different; 
with differing physical, as well as cultural and psychological traits. Using the 
Hamitic theory, the Europeans found reasons to institutionalize meanings of 
identities that would see families to be forced to exist under separate identities.  
“Tutsi” and “Hutu” as terms have certainly existed for a long time. Rwanda was a 
complicated but highly organized society, which, like any other kingdom 
including those in Europe, faced a number of local political issues. Furthermore 
the entire population spoke the same language, shared religious beliefs and ate 
the same food. However, at the beginning of nineteenth century Belgians 
subjected Rwandans to a number of changes and showed preference to one small 
group of people, and determined the Nyiginya dynasty to govern. What followed 
in the period of 1950’s to 1990s was the indoctrination of the youth and old alike 
in shaping their conceptualization of identity, both of the self and of the “other” 





Post-colonial Rwanda, the “learning of identity” and key triggers of 
violence and genocide 
 
As indicated above, the colonialists gave new meaning to terms of Hutu, Tutsi 
and Twa identities using race science. Through these studies they were able to 
interpret Rwanda to further their political ambitions during colonialism. 
Through educational institutions that emerged yet accessible to few, the 
difference in one’s identity was given meaning. This occurred first in the instance 
where being Tutsi could increase one’s chances to go to school and thus 
belonging to the Hutu category meant one could not access education.  In post-
independence era, influenced by the colonialists, the roles were reversed by the 
new political and mainly Hutu dominated class. It was at this point that the Hutu 
and Tutsi identity were given new meanings. Similarly identity cards also 
facilitated stratification by ascribing ethnic identity and thus determining who 
was allowed into schools and better paying professions and who was not.  The 
identity cards were such a critical piece of paper, especially in the post-
independence era that some people would go to the extent of purchasing the 
relevant identity that at the time would allow them to access opportunity.  
 
The church and the popular culture, such as the songs of Bikindi, offered 
meaning to the identities and how to act as a result of this ascribed meaning of 
identity. The priests, nuns, Bishops went beyond preaching and interpreting the 
identity difference,  to offering a moral position of what actions should be taken 
as a result of being Hutu or Tutsi. In the case of 1994 genocide, especially the 
catholic clergy, they defended the Hutu cause in their pulpits, in their own 
churches and outside offering an example of how one could act against the Tutsi 
because of their Hutu identity.  As an outcome of all these factors combined the 
population what inhabited Rwanda learn new ascribed meanings to their 
identities meanings, which would lead to the attempt annihilation of an entire 







Prior to this republic there was the first president Mbonyumutwa from January-
October of 1961 who was an interim leader. He was a Hutu but had been also a 
Chief under the Kingdom structure. His role as president was not significant; but 
as a politician his physical beating in Byimana by a group of old Tutsi elites who 
were losing power is considered to have instigated the violence that followed in 
1959. Gregoire Kayibanda who was president from 1962-1973 and was replaced 
by Habyarimana. Kayibanda’s government was instrumental in bringing the 
Hutus into decision-making positions. In this period, they determined what kinds 
of conversations happened in public realm, the place of Tutsis and Twas in that 
conversation, fixing those identities that were created by Belgians to reject the 
Kingdom’s vagueness on these conversations. Inevitably, a few Tutsis were 
considered for official positions but were not influential. In this period, the old 
elites who had now fled to neighbouring countries continued to engage, but in 
exile or through short term and weak insurgency attacks in rural areas.  
 
A new identity classification also started to emerge. Although the Germans had 
created a bridge for Northerners to engage, the question of regionalism started 
to emerge. The Abanyenduga (those from the South where the first president 
originated) and Abacyiga (which were the Northerners) started new 
conversations of belonging and therefore of access to economic and social 
mobility. The first Republic perceived the Northerners as good military men and 
important ‘partners’ because of their hard working culture, fertile land that could 
provide food for other regions and their straightforwardness on expressing 
disagreements and social issues. Thus stereotypes were not only developed in 
these conversations but were also reflected in national political leadership, 
societal organization (marriage etc) and economic activities. This would 
determine the second violent change in 1973.  
 
There were Hutu elites whose conversation tone were clearer and sought to 
empower the Hutu identity. These conversations were empowering to the 
majority in Rwanda who saw this as an opportunity to emancipate themselves 
from what was regarded as a Tutsi oppressive Kingdom. In this instance, only the 
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minority Tutsi were silenced and their importance in society was renegotiated.  
The Twa remained absent as they were in pre-colonial and colonial periods. 
Belgians were also present in these conversations but continuously took an 
informal role of influence using the Catholic Church, newspapers, and through 
missionary schools.  
 
The role of education 
Education created an important space for learning identity. Hutus who did have 
access to schooling during the colonial period were generally educated in 
Kiswahili, a language considered inferior to the assimilationist Francophone 
education received by Tutsi. This system served to reproduce the political and 
social distinction between Tutsis and Hutus at an intellectual level (Mamdani, 
2001:111). Many scholars concur with Mamdani’s argument that this separatist 
education “was not simply to prepare [the Hutu] for manual labor but also to 
underline the political fact that educated Hutu were not destined for common 
citizenship” (ibid, 89-90). 
 
During colonization formal education was considered to be quite prestigious and 
reserved only for people with high social status. Not only did the import of 
formal education within Rwanda begin the ethnic stratification of Rwandan 
society by only allowing  the children of Tutsi chiefs to attend schools,  in 
addition, the introduction of ethnic identity cards in schools after 1950 by the 
Catholic Church push forward these ideas of ethnic division  (Uvin,1997,95). The 
Roman Catholic Church first introduced formal education in Rwanda at the 
beginning of the 20th century. The main purpose of this education at this time 
was to first train catechists to spread Catholicism to the local population. Second, 
train auxiliaries to assist the colonial masters for local administration, 
agricultural production of cash crops for export and enforcement of labor. Thus, 
labor forced on peasants, resulted in the first exodus of the Rwandans into 
neighboring Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya in the 1930s and 1940s. 
 
However, even though myths about Tutsi identity were spread and widely 
accepted, education was not afforded to all Tutsis. Education was given to the 
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few who were regarded as nobles and whom the European administration would 
trust power with. The preference was given to men over women. Women were 
left to be taught by nuns, or the wives of male missionaries on how to sew and 
make beautiful artifacts that were of European standard. This was despite pre-
colonial Rwanda having a strong culture of art which had been produced both by 
men and women. In this setting, the Rwandan society was redefined even in 
terms of profession. The gendered lenses of Europeans suggested to Rwandan 
society that females were not capable of understanding the kind of learning that 
was taking place in a classroom. 
 
With the political changes of 1959 also came a new education system and new 
ways of learning identity.  In 1959 King Mutara died in a hospital. The Tutsi 
population, reading mischief in his death, accused the Belgians and the Hutus of 
killing him, causing violence to quickly spread. The Hutu population, having an 
advantage in terms of numbers, decimated the Tutsi as they fled the country. The 
Belgians replaced the Tutsi administrators with members of the Hutu 
population. After World War II, Rwanda became a trusteeship of the United 
Nations. There was a trusteeship council whose members visited Rwanda five 
times between 1948 and1962 in order to push for the creation of a democracy 
and provision of political education for the people of Rwanda. Elections for 
administrative and chief levels were held in 1952 and 1953 respectively, and 
Tutsis won in both instances (Madame, 2001, 13). In 1957, Hutu led political 
movements began to campaign for the end of the Tutsi Kingdom rule. As 
independence played out, European administrators and Hutu elite argued that 
the Hutu majority and not the Tutsi minority should lead independent Rwanda. 
By late 1959, Hutu aggression spread throughout the country and finally in 1960 
Gregoire Kayibanda, a Hutu, headed the provincial government. The monarchy 
was abolished in 1961 and on 1st July 1962 Rwanda was granted full 
independence (Gellately and Kierman, 2003, 330). 
 
This political change presented a new opportunity for Rwandans to re-imagine 
their history and a society that would provide equal opportunities to education 
and re-orient ideas on ethnic identities. However, given that Belgians priests and 
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administrators remained, they continued to influence ideas of identity. A kind of 
rigidity was introduced as the former colonial administrators and priests were 
replaced by new ones who favored the rule of the majority, known as the Hutus. 
This change was influenced by a social revolution in Belgium that put the 
majority Walloon in power over the Flemish minority and therefore desired to 
replicate the same ideas in Rwanda. The new Hutu administration of the first 
premier minister, Mbonyumutwa, followed by that of the first Republic of 
Kayibanda, aligned itself with the new colonial powers to produce identity 
knowledge that encouraged division and hatred against the Tutsis who were 
considered aliens. This change in attitude and in political power facilitated the 
1959 massacre that saw thousands of Tutsi homes burned, and others forced 
into exile. Those who remained were tortured and denied social mobility 
opportunities such as access to schools.   
 
Learning about identity in schools was primarily restricted to Hutu elite; most of 
whom were males. They were mentored by white priests, who taught them 
theories and promoted them to seminaries. A few Tutsi elites, including the well 
respected Bishop Alex Kagame, who remained in Rwanda, managed to continue 
to produce knowledge about the history of the Rwandan identity.  
 
There were a number of changes to the education sector after independence. 
Primary schooling, for children aged six and above, was declared free and 
obligatory. A number of secondary schools also helped to expand secondary 
education and higher education was established by opening the National 
University of Rwanda in 1963. It has been noted that by 1975, school enrollment 
at primary level had increased from 250,000 pupils at the time of independence 
to 386,000 pupils.  At secondary school level, by this time, there were 64 schools 
with a student population of 11,227 students. The National University of Rwanda 
had six faculties; medicine, agriculture, law, social sciences, natural sciences and 
arts. It had a student enrollment of 619. 
 
Despite the increase, in practice this education expansion was not available for 
all Rwandans. The education system remained discriminatory after 
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independence, this time in favor of the Hutu (commons) and against the Tutsi 
(royals) and Twa (pygmies). In 1978, for example, reforms to nationalize 
education were made. However rather than correcting the errors of the colonial 
legacy, attendance quotas were introduced for each ethnic group. Thus, students 
were no longer admitted to secondary schools on the basis of grades merit, but 
on the policy of quota. Article 60 of the law on public instruction stated that 
transition from primary to secondary school should respect the following 
criteria: results at national exam, the progress in the student’s performance, 
regional, ethnic and sex balance. This was the policy of social justice (Iringaniza) 
that would negatively affect many Tutsi children.  
 
Second Republic  
The second Republic of Habyaramina, emerged out of these conversations and 
stereotypes of what regional identity meant. The Kayibanda regime ended in 
1973 through a coup d” Etat by his chief of staff Habyarimana Juvenal. 
Habyarimana had been appointed by Kayibanda as head of the army given he 
was from the North and had received good colonial medical and military 
education in Zaire and Rwanda.  
 
Habyarimana through the one candidate single party (MRND) elections 
consolidated political power and introduced a culture of fear around elections 
and always received an overwhelming 100% of votes.  The Northerners (who 
were identified as Hutus and proud to have little mixed families) regarded 
Southerners as weak, Tutsi lovers and lazy. Although there were stereotypes for 
communities from other regions, the Southern and Northern identities were 
more visible in these conversations.  Habyarimana also put a few Tutsis in power 
for representation purposes but also created a small house (akazu) of advisors 
from his hometown sub-region of Northern-West. These were the managers of 
mainstream and conversations allowed on public on identity, politics, economic 
development, military, law, parliament, society, art and religion. They dominated 
every sphere of Rwandan society as leaders. However, a push to open up 




Southerners who were disfranchised as well as politicians from mixed families 
and a few Tutsis were involved. The Twa’s voice was ignored and their 
discussion of their own identity existed in silence. In fact under Habyarimana’s 
government, they sought to move Twas into their own villages in a given region. 
The idea was introduced as a development policy but actually ended up 
excluding them from national conversations and instead into disengaged citizens 
who were rarely consulted on any matters of society, including those that 
directly concerned their lives.  
 
Under the Kayibanda government’s system of quotas it stated a certain number 
of Tutsi children could attend certain schools. Additionally, school textbooks at 
the time were written to portray Tutsis as “rich, foreign and oppressors” 
(Rutayisire, Kabano and Rubagiza, 2003, p.332). Excerpts from textbooks 
presented the Tutsi as foreigners from Ethiopia (as hypothesized by colonialists) 
and later in the genocide dehumanized them calling them names like snake and 
cockroach. These stereotypes also perpetuated outside of the classrooms and 
thus children at a young age were indoctrinated with ideologies of divisions and 
hatred towards the Tutsis. Developed later, under the rule of President Juvenal 
Habyarimana, was Commandment Six of the Hutu Ten Commandments that 
state, “A Hutu majority must prevail throughout the educational system (pupils, 
scholars, teachers) (Kangura, 1990)”. Thus, not only were the Tutsis 
marginalized for decades through racist ideologies in schools, but their ability to 
participate in the education system was limited as well.  
 
In 1980s and 1990s, this mistreatment extended to those who were of mixed 
ethnicities, in particular those from the southern part of Rwanda, popularly 
referred to as Abanyendunga -distinguished from "true" Hutu who were called 
Abacyiga. The teaching of identity through the education sector had been 
successful in educating Rwandans about meaning of their identity and how to 
practice their ethnic belonging to a community. Using the learned race theories 
and Hamitic myths, the entire Rwandan population had been clearly divided; 





Until the late 1980s the state was a strong institution controlled by Hutu elite 
largely from the North of Abakiga, the home of President Habyarimana. The state 
was able to offer the best access to upward social, political and economic 
mobility.  It not only controlled access to education, but also dominated the 
employment market in a country were over 90 percent of the employment was 
agricultural based. According to Uvin (1998, 22) “the state effectively was in 
charge of all fields of human endeavor and all sectors of the economy” (Uvin, 
1998, 22). Further, as exemplified by Table 2, the majority of the pupils receiving 
education in the year 1980s were predominantly Hutus. Table 3 showcases that 
even foreign scholarships were distributed according to regions - affording more 
opportunities to those in the North, in Hutu dominated areas such as Gisenyi, 
Ruhengeri and to some extent Byumba.  
 
Particular attention should be paid here to Gisenyi, the president’s home (and his 
wife’s) province, which had the highest number of foreign scholarships - a total 
of 204. Most of the elites, afford scholarships, travelled to France to study. When 
they returned they often formed part of the Hutu government and or ended up in 
Akazu as the main political advisors of the President. These scholarships did not 
benefit areas such as Kibuye (62), Kibungo (62) that were considered to be 
inhabited by the Tutsi population. It is evident that these Hutu elites practiced 
the Hutu identity as they understood the benefits attached to the power and 
wealth this identity carried. Their foreign education facilitated the learning of 
their identity as they immersed themselves in the colonial literature on Rwanda 
which was readily available in European Universities, especially in France and 
Belgium.   
 
Schools Curricula 
Curricula used in schools played a significant role in reinforcing these identity 
categories. Perhaps, even more harmful in terms of social equality and stability 
was the extent to which many elements of the institutional structure - teacher 
and pupil behavior, textbooks and curricula - inspired ethnic division and hatred. 
This had a particular effect on the students” psychological development in what 
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could be said to be their most formative years. In the majority of schools in pre-
1994 Rwanda the hidden (and not so hidden) curricula were designed to 
segregate and alienate ethnic minorities, ensuring cultural reproduction and 
safeguarding of the dominant position of a certain group (Feinberg and Soltis, 
2004, 62-64).  
 
Given the overt and underlying structural discrimination and divisive inequality, 
it is perhaps surprising that the international community considered Rwanda a 
story of development success. Before 1994 Rwanda economic progress was 
described as a successful model of macroeconomic development. A World Bank 
Report in 1982 commented that “Rwanda’s approach to economic and social 
development could be considered successful” (Uvin, 1998, 43, Obura, 2003, 40). 
Rwanda was one of the most aided countries in the world, receiving a significant 
amount more from donors than from private investment and commercial export 
revenues combined.  
 
However, despite the presence of over 200 NGOs and bilateral and multilateral 
donor representatives in the country prior to 1994, not a single one denounced 
the official racism and development of an increasingly divided society; “not even 
in the 1990s when it was clear that they were [preparing] for mass killings” 
(Uvin, 1998,44). During the years leading up to the genocide donor agencies 
adopted what can only be described as a policy of “voluntary blindness” to the 
politics of injustice, exclusion and prejudice in Rwanda (Uvin, 2001, 177).  
 
It is ironic that the very government that was teaching and promoting hatred 
actively and openly was praised by the International Community. The foreigners 
working with/or in Rwanda seemed to take these identity categories for granted, 
assuming them to be an intrinsic part of Rwandan society and thus learned to 
ignore the marginalization of the Tutsis and Hutus (those from the South) 
population that was being excluded from the country’s development agenda. The 
fact that the World Bank continued to provide resources for the Rwandan 
government was a clear indication to the Rwandan Hutu elites that their practice 
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of discriminating based on these ethnic categories was acceptable. In fact, it was 
almost like they were being rewarded for it. 
The donors were operating in an apolitical, technocratic bubble that cast Rwanda 
as a “development problem” that could be and was being “solved” through 
planning, infrastructural development and research; projects designed and 
overseen by their international “experts” (Uvin, 1998, 44-46). 
  
From 1990s the second Republic faced various challenges, including the influx of 
political refugees joining those of 1950s and the rise of internal opposition 
amongst the political parties. In 1992, the then Minister of Secondary Education 
opposed discrimination against Tutsi in schools, testifying the role of ethnic and 
regional quotas in education as a preliminary stage to the 1994 genocide. She 
was immediately cautioned by the regime and discriminatory quotas were 
radicalized. At the same time, a militia for the ruling political parties (CDR and 
MRND) was created. These parties taught young Hutus what it meant to be a 
young Hutu and how to kill the Tutsis and moderate Hutus who were proposing 
a so-called threat to their existence. Concurrently to Hutu rule in the government 
during this time extremist media was being run by those who had learned and 
practiced the Hutu identity, and thus subsequently grew supportive of the 
Movement Republican National Pour La Democratie et le Development (MRND) 
regime that were already infecting hatred in indoctrinated minds. Finally, the 
Interahamwe (those who attack together), a group of young rebels, were the 
incarnation of the discriminatory educational policy being trained to hate and 
kill and later would prepare and execute the 1994 genocide 
 
The role of “identity cards” 
As was the case for previous identity cards were introduced during colonial rule. 
However, they also continued to play an important role in influencing identity 
divisions in post-independence era as they used by the government of the time 
as an efficient way of popularizing identity knowledge. The project of assigning 
identity cards is an example of what James Scott calls “state simplification”.  
Scott’s analysis of “villigization” and “collectiveness” can be applied to the 
understanding of Rwanda’s case. Villigization was a system that grouped a group 
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of people in one area into one village. As the ideas of Scott suggests, in Rwanda 
state administrators employed villigization as measures to imagine and create 
collective identities.  
 
The first identity cards issued in the post-independence era were for the state 
administration.  In1954, scientific studies had identified particular regions in 
Rwanda that were inhabitable to humans, such as Nyamata. The Tutsi 
communities were then moved to Nyamata by the new Hutu Government from 
various regions of Rwanda. This process of relocation meant that at times 
families were separated from each other. Additionally many were moved to 
areas known to have diseases. The identity cards illustrate two different ways of 
how the State simplified and popularized instructions about which people were. 
The first identity cards designated and gave directions as to where people could 
live. For example, if you were designated a Tutsi on your identity card you were 
indirectly being instructed to relocate to a particular region. The instruction they 
provided, however, was indirect as they were inaccessible in language.  While 
the identity cards were used to designate the regions in which one could live 
more importantly what they really did was give instructions to others about 
identity. As certain ethnicities were designated to be located in a particular 
region, if you were aware of one’s region then you could decipher their ethnicity.   
 
The role of popular culture in the learning of identity 
Rwandans who had a stake in preserving the categories and their prescribed 
hierarchal meaning understood the importance of employing popular culture to 
consolidate differences. No longer were the terms “Hutu” and “Tutsi” simply in 
reference to ethnic categories but they were so entrenched into society that they 
had real psychological and emotional implications. The terms were no longer 
just about quality of life but more important than what you were given for being 
a Hutu and Tutsi were the implications on your psyche.  
The Hutu Ten Commandments, published in the popular media forum, the 
Kangura newspaper, were taught around villages and in different communities 
to offer a set of rules that would guide the Hutu population. The Ten 
Commandments, authored and published by Hassan Ngeze, was a document of 
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identity reference.  They were as follows; (translated in English as they were 
composed in Kinyarwanda) 
1. Every Hutu must know that the Tutsi woman, wherever she may be, is 
working for the Tutsi ethnic cause. In consequence, any Hutu is a traitor who: 
- Acquires a Tutsi wife; 
- Acquires a Tutsi concubine; 
- Acquires a Tutsi secretary or protégée.  
2. Every Hutu must know that our Hutu daughters are more worthy and more 
conscientious as women, as wives and as mothers. Aren’t they lovely, excellent 
secretaries, and more honest! 
3. Hutu women, be vigilant and make sure that your husbands, brothers and sons 
see reason.  
4. All Hutus must know that all Tutsis are dishonest in business. Their only goal 
is ethnic superiority. We have learned this by experience from experience. In 
consequence, any Hutu is a traitor who: 
- Forms a business alliance with a Tutsi 
- Invests his own funds or public funds in a Tutsi enterprise 
- Borrows money from or loans money to a Tutsi 
- Grants favors to Tutsis (import licenses, bank loans, land for construction, 
public markets..) 
5. Strategic positions such as politics, administration, economics, the military and 
security must be restricted to the Hutu. 
6. A Hutu majority must prevail throughout the educational system (pupils, 
scholars, and teachers). 
7. The Rwandan Army must be exclusively Hutu. The war of October 1990 has 
taught us that. No soldier may marry a Tutsi woman.  
8. Hutu must stop taking pity on the Tutsi. 
9. Hutu wherever they are must stand united, in solidarity, and concerned with 
the fate of their Hutu brothers. Hutu within and without Rwanda must constantly 
search for friends and allies to the Hutu Cause, beginning with their Bantu 
brothers. 
Hutu must constantly counter Tutsi propaganda. 
Hutu must stand firm and vigilant against their common enemy: the Tutsi.  Comment [J3]:  
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10. The Social Revolution of 1959, the Referendum of 1961 and the Hutu 
Ideology must be taught to Hutu of every age. Every Hutu must spread the word 
wherever he goes. Any Hutu who persecutes his brother Hutu for spreading and 
teaching this ideology is a traitor. 5 
Popular culture was used to impart the meanings of difference. In the 1990s 
many Rwandans had been either forced to choose a certain ethnic affiliation, or 
they had chosen to believe they were Hutu or Tutsi, Hutu marginalization, or 
corrupted an official in order to fabricate an identity card that did not 
correspond to their so-called prescribed identity. The fluidity in these definitions 
allowed many, especially those from mixed marriage, to change their identity 
and belonging in order to access social and economic benefits that were affiliated 
with a certain group at any given time. There were also those, especially from the 
North, who convinced of their identity, as they believed that no Mucyiga of 
Abacyiga Northern region could be a Tutsi.  
 
Asked which aspect of pop culture was most influential during pre-genocide 
period, most of my interviewees spoke of  the music Simoni Bikindi was who was 
very popular; his music was aired everyday in the genocide.  Bikindi’s song, acted 
in a similar manner to the Ten Commandments, providing guidelines for what 
could be considered a “true Hutu”.  Bikindi made it clear that he hated those who 
were sympathizers of the RPF or Tutsis.  Playing the songs on the radio created 
an intellectual curiosity to engage and analyze Bikindi’s music and its influence 
on teaching of the Rwandan identity, an analysis that has been left out of 
literature on Rwandan genocide.  
 
The importance of his music calls for an understanding as to who he was, what 
his music was about, why it became successful in teaching the masses about their 
identity and most importantly why it was played heavily during the genocide by 
a radio aiming to promote hatred. Simoni Bikindi, a University graduate and 
talented musician from the Northern part of Rwanda, expressed in his songs his 
belief that he was a Hutu – an identity which had to be protected and fought for. 
                                                 
5 (Quotes from the Gisozi genocide memorial, Kigali, in field notes of summer 2009. It was published in 




As exemplified in his lyrics analyzed below, Bikindi had mastered the art of 
popularizing and spreading ideas he had learned in University and other forms 
of education - primary and high school – which had carried the undertones of the 
myths about Rwandan identity that had been fabricated by the colonial powers.  
 
Bikindi’s music illustrates just one case in which artists were influential in 
educating the public about identity. Commencing in the 1980s Bikindi composed 
and performed his music with his cultural group in the tunes of traditional 
genres that encouraged and led his fans to dance. This included wedding songs 
such as Umwumba. Later his music became increasingly based on politically 
charged compositions and were more and more repeatedly played on the 
Rwanda Television Des Milles Collines (RTLM) radio to encourage the Hutus 
masses to go out and kill. In these songs his lyrics were so bloody that when 
heard many Tutsis expressed their feelings of displacement in the Rwandan 
society.  Some of his most famous compositions included; Intabaza which was 
also popularly known as Bene Sebahinizi (The Sons of the Cultivators) - meaning  
that Hutus could be identified according to the colonial theories had  identified 
as those who work as farmers , Ingabo z’ igihugu – a song the government’s army 
he  composed to motivate soldiers who were fighting against the RPF insurgency 
between  1990-1994, Nimwe mwariraye ingabo z’ u Rwanda – a song expressing 
the Rwandan army is the one that always won the battle, Twasezereye ingoma ya 
cyami na gikoronize, - another about resisting colonialism and the oppression of 
kingdoms  and another song, officially entitled Akabyutso (The Awakening) was 
commonly referred to as Nanga Abahutu, or I Hate Hutus.  
These songs were analyzed by the prosecution of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 2008 finding him guilty of influencing the Hutu 
masses to hate the Tutsis.  A closer look at the verses of two of these songs 
provides clear examples of how the public was educated though this informal yet 
influential means of music. Bikindi began both of these “teaching” songs with 
traditional instruments - in particular the umuduri which was an instrument 
similar to the western violin.  He used the ingoma a drum which was important 
in Rwandan culture. He used sounds of amayojyi y’ intore – the bells wore on the 
legs of young male dancers. Before they could even interpret and understand the 
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music, the use of these instruments was very significant in attracting the 
attention of young peoples. The majority of young Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda 
played, danced to and enjoyed Bikindi’s music, especially whenever it was played 
on the radio.  Bikindi was a very intelligent composer, good singer and his humor 
aided him to become an outstanding performer. 
 
 Nanga Abahutu 
This song was composed in 1993 as the battle between the Rwanda Patriotic 
Front (RPF) and the army of the Rwandan government was intensifying in the 
North. Bikindi composed this song to rebuke any Hutus who were known to be 
supporting the Tutsis-dominated RPF. During this period both Hutus and Tutsis, 
who were sympathizers of the RPF, were either, assassinated or imprisoned as 
part of a campaign to stop the ibyitso or otherwise known as the RPF intelligence 
in the country.  
Nanga Abahutu, nanga abahutu basebya ubuhutu. 
Benwacu, Abo bahutu batiyizi, biyibagizwa icyo baricyo 
Nanga abo bahutu bagenda batabona iyo bagana (x2) 
 
I hate those Hutus, those de-hutuized Hutus, who have given up their identity, 
dear comrades. I hate those Hutus, those Hutus who walk blindly (x2) 
 
Ibyo bicucu,barwana intambara batazi icyo igamije 
Nanga abo bahutu abo bahutu umuntu azana kwica bakica abandi bahutu 
Kandi kubanga nibyo byiza (x2) 
 
Fools, naive Hutus committed in a war of which they do not know the cause,” he 
has written. I hate those Hutus who can be brought to kill and who, I swear, kill 
Hutus, dear comrades. And if I hate them, its all for the better. 
 
As it was the case for most of his songs, this song was easy to sing and memorize, 
it had an infectious rhythm and therefore at times people would play it at 
weddings, or at other social gatherings. This particular track called for the hatred 
and killing of the fellow Hutus who were not supporting the government, but 
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were sympathizing with the Tutsis in the country and those in the RPF rebel 
group. The song was also very instrumental in encouraging the youth to kill 
anyone, including Hutus, who were seemed to be hiding Tutsis during the 
genocide. This led to the killing of thousands of innocent people who had 
resisted the genocidal ideology of hating Tutsis. By playing it in social events, or 
during public government events the song inflated hatred in the masses ‘minds. 
The song forced people to decide whether or not they hated Tutsis. It encouraged 
the masses to be good Hutus and to hate Tutsis who did not deserve to be liked, 
or associated with. In 1992 and 1993, various high schools began rioting, with 
many refusing to be taught by Tutsi teachers, or their Tutsi principals. The idea 
of hating the Tutsi became a reality when “Tutsi-like” students were being 
harassed in schools, both by teachers and their Hutu colleagues. The song was 
always sang whenever riots were held, the rioters, however, went unpunished by 
government authorities who allowed the hatred to continue through such vocal 
expression.  
 
This song was always played on RTLM, the radio station the masses in rural 
areas listened to. This was problematic as they tended to be uneducated and thus 
followed whatever their local government official or in this case the radio 
dictated. In his songs Bikini continued to remind people of the stereotypes of 
what made a “good Hutu”  – a good Hutu was considered to be very short , lighter 
skinned, supposedly not intelligent or well educated, but mainly those who were 
the majority poor agricultural farmers who  do not drink milk or care for cows.  
In opposition he emphasized the Tutsis as very dark, tall intelligent in schools, 
with attractive elegant women and usually possessing many cows and enjoying 
drinking milk.  
 
The role of the Catholic Church 
Apart from the classroom setting church, especially the Catholic Church, 
assumed a central role in Rwandan education. Catholic churches met every 
Sunday often with two or three masses. Individuals who wanted to be 
considered “good Christians” went for repentance approximately three times a 
week if not more. Every corner of Rwanda had a catholic church. Like schools, 
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perishes were either headed by white fathers, or Rwandan priests who had been 
trained in seminaries. Rwanda was reputed to be one of the most overtly 
religious countries in Africa with over 80% of the population being Roman 
Catholic believers in between 1960”s to 1990”s (Peterson, 2001, 24).  
 
Catholicism went hand-in-hand with politics and thus it was important that all 
the post-colonial and powerful Hutu presidents, were baptized Catholics – it was 
part of their identity. Every young man and woman who wanted to develop in 
Rwanda, needed to be baptized by the Catholic Church to be considered modern. 
Even with the introduction of Protestant churches in the nineteenth century, the 
most popular religious identity remained catholic. As it has been the case with 
various human societies, matters of questioning spirituality has been left to 
experts, often priests, or religious figures, who assume a position in society as 
God’s representative. In the Rwandan context, priests were feared, respected, 
adored and at times even a bishop was worshiped and praised. A Bishop 
assumed similar social position that the King occupied in pre-colonial Rwanda. 
He had a divine appointment, which should be trusted and even feared by 
politicians and presidents. Each public appearance of a Bishop was often shown 
in media, and visits to the Vatican or visits of a Pope or Catholic cardinal were 
more organized than that of a European Head of State. In fact the church and 
state were so closely linked that this relationship was often referred to as an 
umbilical relationship (Gachuruzi, 1999, 86).  
 
With this kind of religious indoctrination, and repeated liturgy every Sunday in 
foreign Latin language that was not interpreted in Kinyarwanda or French, 
majority of Rwandan repeated words of a priest often without questioning. This 
tradition allowed priests to be viewed as divine authorities both in the church 
and outside.  
 
The prominence of the Church in Rwandan society was demonstrated in 1994 
when certain Church officials were accused with strong evidential accounts to 
have participated in the killing of over 800,000 people. When the massacres 
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began thousands of people sought refuge and protection in the churches.6 This 
turned out to be a costly mistake as the militia used the churches as 
slaughterhouses. Priests, nuns and Bishops communicated moral lessons about 
the ethics of killing. Interpreting what identity means and how to act as a result 
of this understanding.  In the case of the genocide they did so with large and 
negative ramifications. Bishops and other clergies were actively involved, both 
directly and indirectly, in the massacres. Sometimes this was by acting as 
informants while in other instances the killings were “…accepted …carried out by 
individual nuns and priests,” (Peterson, 2001, 4). The Church earned itself” the 
reputation of being a mute church for its blindness to the atrocities.    
 
Pre-genocide Rwanda and attempt at political settlement 
 
The pre-genocide political atmosphere of the late 1980’s and early 1990s 
amplified the question of Tutsi refugees in neighbouring countries. As a result 
the dilemma of the Tutsi inside Rwanda was revived in conversations. In seeking 
to dominate and manage those discussions, the Akazu intellectuals sought to 
clarify who belonged to the Hutu identity and the privileges that should be 
accorded to them. In a way the 10 commandments of Hutus were an effort to 
reunite Hutus in all regions and disregard the regional identities that had taken 
root. Again these conversations were not only verbal but also through symbols of 
language and art like drawings of ‘isuka- a hoe” and the noble professional of 
agriculture as unifying symbols of hutu identity.  
 
Thus the attack of the RPA in 1990 was timely as it added to other noise that was 
evolving among Rwandans. It is this noise that attracted some international 
attention, which was in tern diminished by France. Under Habyarimana, France 
had replaced Belgium in many ways as the French influenced and were official 
sponsors of conversations on Hutu and more important the Northerners political 
power consolidation efforts.  In return the French received advantageous trade 
and access to Rwanda’s regional strategic position. The relationship between 
                                                 
6For analysis of scale of the role of the church in Rwanda, see; Carol Rittner, John K. Roth, Wendy Wittworth, 
Genocide in Rwanda, Complicity of Churches?, Paragon House, London,  (2004) 
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governments was also primarily driven by friendships between both presidents’ 
families of Mitterrand and Habyarimana. The UN led Arusha peace talks were a 
signal that the International actors were alert to the conversations that were 
increasingly turning violent locally and with potential regional implications.  
 
The political settlement in Rwanda has been widely discussed by scholars across 
many disciplines.  In reality though the political settlement processes in Rwanda 
are not deliberately sequenced events, this study merely categorises events in a 
yearly, and at times, a monthly chronological manner for purposes of describing 
the process. In this regard, the political settlement process in Rwanda can be 
classified into three main phases: 
 
Phase one: Pre - genocide 1990-1992.  
This phase began after an outbreak of civil war in 1990 when the Rwandan 
Patriotic Army (RPA)—armed wing of the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF)—based 
in Uganda invaded Rwanda from the northern regions on 1 October 1990. 
Various scholars have identified factors that led to the invasion. Gerard Prunier 
observed that the political instability during President Juvénal Habyarimana 
reign that was occasioned by deteriorating economic conditions in the country 
contributed to the crisis. Prunier argues that ‘shrinking’ sources of revenue from 
agriculture and mining – a major source of enrichment for the elite led to fierce 
internal power struggles as competition for the declining resources intensified.7 
This situation was further exacerbated after the government decided to increase 
taxes especially among peasant farmers and cutting of social services amidst 
threats from drought and declining food production. Moreover, the government 
reaction to criticism was heavy-handed and led to repressing of opposition 
groups and the press.  Furthermore, the real or perceived support RPF in Uganda 
has also been identified as a trigger factor of the invasion.8 Mahmood Mamdani 
also gives an in depth analysis of Uganda’s involvement in the crisis particularly 
                                                 
7 Prunier, Gérard. 1995. The Rwanda crisis: history of a genocide. New York: Columbia University Press, pp 
84-92. 
8 Prunier, Gerard. 1998. "The Rwandan Patriotic Front." In Clapham, Christopher S., ed. African guerrillas. 
Oxford (GB): J. Currey; Reed, Cyrus. 1996. "Exile, Reform, and the Rise of the Rwandan Patriotic 
Front". Journal of Modern African Studies. 34( 3): 479-501; Otunnu, Ogenga 1999. "An Historical Analysis of 
the Invasion by the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA)." In Adelman, Howard, and Astri Suhrke, eds. The Path of a 
Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. 
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on the crisis of citizenship and indigeneity of refugees in Uganda being the fons 
et origo underpinning the invasion lead-up to the invasion.9 The politics of 
indigeneity which included state-sponsored repression, exclusion, expulsion and 
prejudice of Rwandan migrants and refugees in Uganda led to RPF—originally a 
political organisation of Refugees—to organise its self militarily in 1985. The 
RPF initially fought alongside National Resistance Army guerrilla War led by 
Museveni against Obote but later launched an incursion in Rwanda.10 The RPF, 
was at the time, demanding the President Habyarimana’s government to allow 
refugees to return to Rwanda, prepare for elections, adopt a new constitution, 
respect human rights and the rule of law as well as reduce powers of the 
President. 11   In return, the government promised political reforms and 
attempted to negotiate a settlement of establishing a refugee repatriation 
programme.12 However, these attempts failed when it became clear to the RPF 
that the government was trying to covertly exploit factionalism within the RPF’s 
army while at the same time trying to mobilise military support from foreign 
allies.13  Moreover, pressure from both the international and regional community 
demanding for liberalisation of governance in the state through 
democratisation—constitutional reforms, allowing for establishment for multi-
parties and media freedoms—as a means of peace and state building, 
inadvertently worsened the situation in Rwanda in several ways. First and most 
important was that, although constitutional reforms process paved way for 
plurality and emergence of opposition political parties in August 1991, this 
process was not only façade but took place entirely within northern and 
southern Hutu political elites in President Habyarimana’s  dominant party – 
Movement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND).14 The ruling 
                                                 
9 Mamdani, Mahmood. 2001. When victims become killers: colonialism, nativism, and the genocide in Rwanda. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, pp. 159-184.  
10 Reed, "Exile, Reform, and the Rise of the Rwandan Patriotic Front". 
11 Watson, Catherine. 1992. "War and Waiting". Africa Report. 37 (6): 51. 
12 Otunnu, Ogenga. 1999. "An historical analysis of the invasion by the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA)". The 
Path of a Genocide: the Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire. 31-49. 
13 Help in the form of arms, financial and troops support initially came from France but also other countries 
like Egypt, Belgium, South Africa, Zaire, Britain, Bulgaria, Italy, Israel, and Seychelles provided arms and 
other military support to Rwanda’s governemnt. See Arms Project (Human Rights Watch). 1994. "Arming 
Rwanda: The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the Rwandan War.” New York, NY:  Human Rights 
Watch Arms Project.  
14 Kakwenzire, Joan, & Kamukama, Dixon. 1999. "The development and consolidation of extremist forces in 
Rwanda 1990-1994." In Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, eds. The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda 
Crisis from Uganda to Zaire. New Brunswick, USA: Transaction Publishers, pp. 66-68. 
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political elites including those in the army and civil service , not only exploited 
existing ethnic cleavages and regional differences between the Hutu and Tutsi to 
re-arm and mobilise support for ‘Hutu power’ but confronted with weakening 
dominance of the party, in 1992 they mobilised radical youth groups - 
Interahamwe in MRND to attack opposition parties. At the core of this strategy 
was ‘racialised political discourse’ aimed at ensuring survival of the state by 
eliminating of the political enemies [which meant the Tutsi] and reinstating Hutu 
dominance.15 Furthermore, opening up of the press had an opposite effect. 
Independence of media led to the establishment of both private press and radio 
owned and operated by political elites and Hutu extremist allied to MRND who 
eventually used it to spread Hutu Power propaganda and ideology.16 The 
invasion and the ensuing state-sanctioned extremism especially with the 
formation of Coalition pour la De´fense de la Re´publique (CDR) party, in 1992 
not only re-ignited but crystallised and reinforced politicisation of ethnicity 
between the Hutu and Tutsi protracting political violence that destabilised the 
country.17 Furthermore, it is also worth noting that political processes above 
took place when the country was engaged in a civil war, though in a limited scale. 
Prunier notes that during this time, massacres were a common feature and 
mainly preceded political meetings during which a sensibilisation putting 
peasants ‘in the mood’ to prepare them to kill the RPF and their sympathisers—
process was carried out.18 More importantly was the manner in which the elite 
used the sensibilisation process to manipulate societal culture and traditional 
identities of the peasantry. For instance, after the political meetings the state 
through the ministry of interior would sanction the killings with a coded calling 
                                                 
15 For a detailed explanation on this see, Hintjens, Helen M. 1999. "Explaining the 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda". Journal of Modern African Studies. 372: 241-286; Mamdani, 2001. When victims become killers: 
189-211. 
16 This role of the media in the pre and post genocide in Rwanda for example, use of the Hutu owned 
magazine, Kangura to spread propaganda and Radio Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM) to 
misinform and spread hate messages, has been extensively discussed in Thompson, A. (Ed.). (2007). The 
media and the Rwanda genocide. IDRC. However, a contentious question has been whether propaganda 
fomented the genocide. A recent paper by David Yanagizawa-Drott gives convincing empirical analysis of 
the link between media and conflict and argues that of under certain conditions, propaganda spread 
through mass media especially one that that encourages violence against defenceless and vulnerable ethnic 
minority groups, is capable of instigating participation in violence. See, Yanagizawa-Drott, David. 
"Propaganda and conflict: Theory and evidence from the Rwandan genocide." Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, forthcoming (2010). 
17 Langford, Peter. 2005. " The Rwandan Path to Genocide: The Genesis of the capacity of the Rwandan Post-
colonial State to Organise and Unleash a project of Extermination." Civil Wars, 7(1), 1-27. 
18 Prunier, Op.Cit., pp 137-138.  
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for special umuganda (collective work session) and bourgmestre ‘bush clearing’.  
Despite the double meaning in the two terms they were not only identifiable 
with the illiterate peasants but piggybacked on the traditional political culture of 
a ‘systematic, centralised and unconditional obedience to authority.’ 19 
Conversely, RPA attacks further bolstered Hutu extremism and more 
importantly, militarisation of the society with both the national army Forces 
Armées Rwandaises (FAR) troops and French forces.20  Moreover, the Rwandan 
government used the tense political situation to arbitrarily arrest Tutsi 
intelligentsia and elite business men as well as moderate Hutu sympathisers.  
 
“Conditions of detention were terrible, people being herded like cattle into 
buildings unsuitable for holding such large numbers and at times not given food 
or water for several days. Beatings, theft and rapes were commonplace; some of 
the prisoners were beaten to death simply because they happened to do 
something to displease a drunken guard. Between 11 and 13 October an 
estimated 348 Tutsi civilians were massacred and more than 500 houses burned 
in the Kibilira commune. None of the victims was a RPF fighter or a civilian 
supporter of whom there seemed to be none. In almost every case, the killings 
were to become only too familiar. When questioned about these events at a press 
conference, President Habyarimana answered ‘Civilians? Why should we kill 
civilians if they are not involved in the fighting? There is no revolt.”21  
 
Paradoxically there was massive displacement of people in most of RPF occupied 
territories.  Nevertheless, instability from civil war led to immense suffering both 
from massive internal displacement, collapse of the economy. This eventually led 
to declaration of a ceasefire in August 1992, and the opening of negotiations 
between the transitional government and the RPF. 22 
                                                 
19 Ibid. p 141.  
20 It is estimated before the attack 1990 invasion by RPA, FAR had an arm of 5000 men. By late 1991 the 
FAR had increased to close to 40,000 but poorly trained but armed troops. The army suffered huge losses in 
offensives against RPA especially in northern regions. The state response by the regime was to create armed 
civilians youth militias – interhamwe who René Lemarchand estimated at 30,000 who were trained by the 
presidential guard and coordinated by the akazu (meaning ‘little house in Kinyarwanda) – a core group of 
President Habyarimana inner circle. See, Lemarchand, Rene. 1995 “Rwanda: The rationality of genocide." 
Journal of opinion: 8-11.    
21 Prunier. Op. Cit., pp 109-10 
22 Langford, "The Rwandan Path to Genocide," p. 14.  
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Arusha negotiation Phase 
 
This phase began in June 1992, after regional and international parties made 
calls for negotiations between the Rwandan government and RPF.23 Two main 
issues discussed here that emerged from this phase was; (1)  failure of the 
Arusha process to move beyond sharing of power between political elites to a 
genuine negotiated agreement that provided lasting peace and reconciliation, 
and (2) the inability of external actors to assist in creation of these conditions 
during the process.  Initially, RPF and the Rwandan coalition Government, agreed 
on a three month ceasefire to end hostilities but on condition that a joint political 
military commission is established to serve a complaints mechanism and that 
each party, retains the territory occupied i.e., northern region and the rest of the 
territory respectively; separated by neutral corridor to be monitored by an 
Organization of African Union (OAU) led Neutral Military Observer Group 
(NMOG). This was later followed by a thirteen-month negotiation process, which 
began in July 1992 to agree on the following core principles: 
 
i. Establishing of the rule of law on national unity, democracy, pluralism 
and respect for human rights;  
ii. Formation of national army consisting of government forces and RPF; 
iii. Establishment of power-sharing framework within the framework of 
a Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG).  
The first principle was quickly agreed on.  However, elaborated by Bruce Jones 
the latter two issues were the cornerstone of the Arusha accord; they were 
repeatedly postponed due to disagreements among the political elites and 
eventually did not happen.24 In Rwanda, the extremists within the MRND and 
CDR were to rally the masses against potential power sharing and reorganisation 
                                                 
23 The negotiations were mediated by the Tanzanian government, in Arusha, under the mandate of 
Organization of African Unity (OAU). See Tekle, Amare. 1999. "The OAU: Conflict Prevention Management 
and Resolution." The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire. 111-130. France, Belgium, 
Germany, United Nations and the United States attended as observers but also provided additional leverage. 
In addition, regional states – Uganda, Zaire and Burundi also sent observers to demonstrate regional 
interest.  
24 For a detailed explanation and analysis of the Arusha process see, Jones, Bruce. 1999. "The Arusha peace 
process". The Path of a Genocide: the Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire. 131-156; 
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of the army. A quote of Léon Mugesera, the vice president of MRND sums the 
tension at the time. 
 
“The opposition parties have ploted with the enemy to make the Byumba 
préfecture fall to the Inyenzi [cockroaches]. […] They have plotted to undermine 
our armed forces. […] The law is quite clear on this point: ‘Any person who is 
guilty of acts aiming at sapping the moral of the armed forces will be condemned 
to death.’ What are we waiting for? […] And what about those accomplices 
(ibyitso) here who are sending children to the RPF? Why are we waiting to get 
rid of these families? […] We have to take responsibility into our own hands and 
wipe out these hoodlums.”25 
 
Furthermore, although the Accord attempted to broadly recognise issues of 
systematic exclusion of the Tutsi community at national level it was less clear on 
modalities of how to implement divisive issues such as how to share power 
within the transitional government—mainly presidential powers—as well as 
how to integrate the government and rebel forces into on the national army.26 
Moreover, and more importantly, the Rwanda government regional and 
international actors in the Arusha process paid less attention to other on-going 
forms of exclusion at societal level,27 and systematic forms of violence that had 
begun to emerge during the civil war such as issues of citizenship and 
discriminate forms of sexual violence.28 Despite early intervention of the 
external actors—both regional and international—failure of the negotiation 
process has been blamed to setbacks of impartiality and unmotivated attitude 
towards the crisis particularly lack of commitment to enforce implementation of 
the Arusha agreement. 
  
Two things to note with external intervention, especially the OAU mechanism, 
was the classical peacekeeping dilemma posed by paucity of resources to fund 
                                                 
25 Prunier. Op. Cit., p. 171-172. 
26 See Jones, 1999 Arusha peace process: 141 – 142.  
27 Anacleti, Odhiambo. 1996. "The Regional Response to the Rwandan Emergency". Journal of Refugee 
Studies. 9 (3): 303-311. 
28 Widespread atrocities were perpetuated by both the RPF and FAR. For a summary of this offensive see 
Prunier. Op.Cit., pp 173-191. 
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interventions as well as idiosyncrasies of non-interference, respect of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. This dilemma created several 
challenges, which were reflected in the Rwandan crisis. First, like in many other 
post-cold war conflicts although there was willingness among OAU member 
states to deploy peacekeeping forces—in the case of Rwanda deploy NMOG to 
monitor the ceasefire states—most states were non-committal to funding of the 
force and instead OAU had to rely on western states for funds.29   
 
Second, in hindsight, while focus was directed to resolution of the conflict 
through negotiations and mediation, the Arusha negotiations—now colloquially 
termed as a ‘stillbirth’—was a futile initiative at that time for a number of 
reasons extensively discussed by Bruce Jones.30 Two of them are important to 
mention here. First, was that by the time preventive diplomatic and negotiation 
missions were starting, the RPF had already gained an  upper hand in the 
process from the battlefield victories against the FAR controlled territories. 
Second is the relative failure of regional peace processes to mitigate the conflict 
due to lack of neutrality. Indeed while diplomacy and mediation efforts were 
crucial in the conflict management process, restricting the process to this option 
when the violence had escalated to critical level had severe consequences among 
them capacity of peacekeeping forces to use force in situations of extreme 
hostilities. 31 Impartiality of regional actors shifted the role to international 
actors–whose interest and political will to intervene in Rwanda at the time was 
marginal and slow to respond.32 The latter came to bedevil the implementation 
phase.   
 
                                                 
29 Tekle, 1999. The OAU: Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution, pp. 111-130. 
30 Jones, Bruce. 2007 “Civil War, the Peace Process and Genocide in Rwanda." In Ali, Taisier Mohamed 
Ahmed, and Robert O. Matthews, eds. Civil wars in Africa: roots and resolution. Montreal: McGill-Queen's 
University Press. 
31 Many observers have suggested that delays in deploying UNAMIR See, See, Report of the independent 
inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda: 1999. New York: United 
Nations, pp. 43-44. 
32 Daniela Kroslak has noted that France despite their proximate connection to Rwanda elites especially 
those in the government, politically, they were ‘silent’ and inactive to clear structures of violence 
perpetuated by elites before and during the Arusha negotiation processes. See, Kroslak, Daniela. 2007. The 
role of France in the Rwandan genocide. London: Hurst, pp.154-161. Furthermore, a report of inquiry set to 
investigate UN intervention in Rwanda concluded that lack of political will amongst member states of the 
UN to contribute personnel and resources into UNAMIR contributed to its failure of preventing the genocide. 
See, Report of the independent inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda: 1999.  
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Implementation and outcome 
This phase involved attempts to implement the two main protocols of the Arusha 
peace accord. They included: establishing the BBTG; formation of national army 
consisting of FAR and RPF. A UN led peacekeeping force United Nation 
Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was deployed, though delayed, to 
enforce the accord.33 While the assassination of Burundi’s President Melchior 
Ndadaye by Tutsi military extremists and ensuing violence and killings against of 
Hutu’s in Burundi is said to have triggered and resonated a similar impetus for 
Hutu extremist forces in Rwanda, some evidence suggests on the contrary. On 
one hand some observers suggests of inherent flaws where opportunities to 
contain the violence were missed after failure of actors in the Arusha process to 
address the role of hard-line forces both in the Rwanda government and RPF in 
the process.34  
 
On the other hand some suggest that a myriad of challenges that range from of 
disjuncture  in UNAMIR  occasioned by structural challenges in UNSC systems to 
deliberate plans to failures in responding to deliberate and well-known 
government efforts subvert implementation of the peace agreement may have 
contributed to failure to implement the peace agreement.35 While the former 
perspective points to the internal conversations – mainly between the elite that 
were on-going in Rwanda albeit at the negotiation level, the focus of such 
negotiations is on the short-term by ending the conflict through accommodation 
of elite interests.   
 
The risk of this approach as evidenced in Rwanda, is that an elite-driven process 
hardly represents majority of society’s interest and tend to rely on governance 
                                                 
33 Although the UNSC approved deployment of UNAMIR on 5 October 1993, the peacekeeping forces did not 
arrive in Rwanda until 1 November. This was four months after signing of the Accord.   
34 Literature on this is wide but for detailed analysis see, Storey, Andy. 2012. "Structural violence and the 
struggle for state power in Rwanda: what Arusha got wrong". African Journal on Conflict Resolution. 12 (3): 
7-32; Jones, 2007. Civil War, the Peace Process and Genocide in Rwanda. See also, Khadiagala, Gilbert M. 2002 
"Implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement on Rwanda." In Stedman, Stephen John, Donald S. Rothchild, 
and Elizabeth M. Cousens, eds. Ending civil wars: the implementation of peace agreements. Boulder, Colo: 
Lynne Rienner, pp. 463-498. 
35 For a detailed analysis see Adelman, Howard, and Astri Suhrke. 2004 "Rwanda." In David Malone, ed. The 
UN Security Council: from the Cold War to the 21st century. Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner, pp. 483-499. See 
also, Borton, John, Emery Brusset, and Alistair Hallam. "The international response to conflict and genocide: 
lessons from the Rwanda experience." Study III: Humanitarian Aid and Effects, Steering Committee of the 
Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, Copenhagen (1996).  
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models that emphasise on short-term deals rather than long-term ideals of 
peace. In Rwanda this phase ended in April 1994 after political impasse between 
RPF and Rwanda government after the latter failed to meet part of peace 
agreement. This was followed by resumption of the civil war that later 
degenerated into the genocide against the Tutsi including the widespread sexual 
based violence.36  In this regard, an issue that perhaps warrants further 
interrogation is why the political settlement paid less attention to other on-going 
forms of exclusion at societal level. More importantly is imperative to explore 
why the political settlement was unable to go accommodate not only ethnic 
identity contestations but those of gender and citizenship.   
 
Having not prioritized the question of politicized identities as part of the 
Arusha peace agenda, the political settlement and peace agreements 
remained very fragile throughout the process. Thus the early 1990’s period 
that eventually ended Habyarimana’s rule was charactered by conversations to 
mobilize around hate, and fear of the other (the Tutsi, the foreign) that brought 
elites and ordinary Hutus together in a single act of the Genocide. Of course it’s 
important to note that this was with the exception of the minority but notable 
Hutus who opposed the genocide ideology and even protected the Tutsis who 
would eventually form a new post-genocide identity of ‘survivors’.  
 
 
Post-genocide period: What identity issues that were part of the state-
building conversation were taken into consideration in the settlement and 
post settlement arrangements? 
 
The following is a summary of some key themes that emerged as issues that 
were at the core of the post-genocide peacebuilding efforts in Rwanda. In 
particular, we identify issues and questions that require further research and 
focus during the field research phase.  
 
                                                 
36 On sexual violence during the genocide see, Nowrojee, Binaifer. 1996. Shattered lives: sexual violence 
during the Rwandan genocide and its aftermath. New York: Human Rights Watch.  
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Justice and reconciliation 
 
 Gacaca – This was a practical solution to the increasingly overcrowded 
prison population post-genocide. It has become ‘famous’ as an example of 
local traditional justice. However it did not start due to a desire to use that 
form of justice or for moral reasons. Rather it was a practical solution to a 
complex problem. 
 
 Ethnicity – As part of the reconciliation process ethnic identities are 
encouraged to become less meaningful and forgotten (in order to be 
‘Rwandan’ instead); but as part of pursuing justice the categorisation of 
people retains (conscious or sub-consciously) some ethnic labelling. Zorbas 
(2004) states that ‘returnees’ are Tutsi RPF; ‘old refugees’ are Tutsi’s who left 
Rwanda pre-1990s; ‘new refugees’ are returning Hutu’s who fled to Congo 
post-genocide; ‘victims’ are Tutsi; ‘perpetrators’ are Hutu. Hintjens (2008) 
also discusses these categories as (1) survivors; (2) old caseload returnees; 
(3) new caseload returnees; (4) suspected genocidaires, and shows how the 
pursuit of justice and this labelling can exclude certain Rwandans, for 
example, a child of Hutu-Tutsi marriage whose parents were both killed but 
whose Uncle is pursued as a Killer. There is some sense from the literature of 
a degree of resentment that only Tutsi victims are remembered. There 
certainly appears to be animosity that Hutu’s are never seen as victims within 
the justice-reconciliation discourse – either as victims of RPF atrocities, 
victims of the genocide killings, or suffering/death experienced in the refugee 
camps post-genocide etc.  
 
 Role of history – idea of ‘collective amnesia’ (Buckley-Zistel 2006), where 
horror of genocide is remembered but its root causes are forgotten, in order 
to reconcile and live side-by-side again. This might be due to degree of 
government coercion, fear of other group, or practical need of getting on with 
lives. Is it healthy to forget history in this way in order to move on? Or would 
analysis, understanding and acknowledgement of past be more beneficial? 
These are some of the questions that will form the focus of the field study. 
44 
 
Genocide memorials can be worthy sites of commemoration, but also invoke 
trauma and resentment (Ibrek 2010). Some Hutu’s would prefer they were 
not there in order to forget the past and move on, rather than bring up 
history. History surely plays a part in any peace and state building process. A 
shared history of a nation/people can certainly help bind that country 
together and create some kind of national pride and consciousness, as well as 
a collective acknowledgement of wrongs done.  
 
 Economic development: Tax systems – ‘Ubuletwa’ was a pre-colonial system 
that was resented by locals as they had to pay the King, and the system was 
later abused by the Belgians (Prunier 1995). ‘Ubudehe’ is a post-genocide 
system of local economic development, where communities decide which 
local projects require investment, and poor community members are given 
funds to invest but then pass on profits to the next worthy recipient 
(Niringiye and Ayebale 2012). 
 
 Inequality - NURC survey indicated that economic cleavages were the most 
divisive feature of Rwandan society, rather than ethnicity, indicating the 
primary importance of economic development (evenly spread) in reconciling 
Rwanda. 
 
 Role of Power (and class)– who held and yielded power was of central 
importance 
in pre-colonial Rwanda in shaping social position and identity; ‘ethnic’ identity 
and labelling could shift according to your power, wealth and social role 
(Newbury 2006 reviewing book by Jan Vansina). Due to its extremely high 
population density in pre-colonial times, a high degree of social control was 
always needed to maintain power and stability (Prunier 1995). Likewise Ibreck 
2010 says that Kagame/post-genocide state has marginalised some Tutsi 
survivors, again indicating that maintenance of power is the primary 
consideration rather than ethnic identity.   
The 1959 revolution was against the powerful, rich Tutsi elites rather than 
‘Tutsi’s’ generally (Newbury 1998). Did the role of power and wealth play a role 
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in the genocide? Or had ethnic prejudice by then become engrained and an 
overwhelmingly primary motivator? Hintjens 2008 cautions that the RPFs 
promotion of the 1950s and 60s era as being the beginning of normalising the 
killing of Tutsi’s is worrying, as this ignores the more complex power-wealth 
dynamics that were at play during that time.  
 
At Arusha, the RPF gained a lot (which the extremists greatly resented). Jones 
(1999) concludes this was primarily due to RPFs power on the battlefield, and 
their strong army and military gains. Habyarimana was forced to accept the deal 
only due to the relative power and strength of the RPF against the Government 
forces. 
 
 Class – This paper has showed how colonial education was racist but also 
‘classist’, whereby the Tutsi elite were educated, rather than just all Tutsi’s. 
And again during the Habyarimana era textbooks labelled Tutsi’s as rich (as 
well as foreign and oppressors), and the songs of Bikindi said Hutu’s were 
uneducated poor farmers (with Tutsi’s the opposite). This all shows that 
ethnic identity was always attached to wealth and position/power. Hintjens 
(2008) argues that Rwanda is divided by class, now more than ever, between 
the rich city dwellers and poor rural farmers. The poor must be given the 
opportunity to develop and express their own identity (which may indeed 
have ethnic elements) rather than being subject to government-led, top down 
prescriptions of what their identity is allowed to be.  
 
 Religion – Peterson 2001 says from 1960’s-1990’s Rwanda was an 
overwhelmingly Catholic country, with an ‘umbilical relationship’ between 
Church and State. What role is religion and religious identity playing in 
Rwanda now? This is an area where this research requires more focus. A key 
question during field research will be to assess the degree to which religion is 
playing a bigger role in reconciliation and state-building. 
 
 Role of the ‘foreigner’ – perceiving who were the rightful citizens of Rwanda 
and who was the ‘foreign’ invader clearly played a role in the genocide. But 
46 
 
what about the role of the genuine foreigner, i.e. non-Rwandans and the 
international community? The international community clearly played a role 
in Arusha, applying pressure to sign agreements; and was then shockingly 
absent during the genocide. How it is perceived and utilised now? Donor 
funding is of course important in this regard. But the international 
community has (rightly) been vilified for its lack of action in the genocide, 
and Kagame now often criticises outside interference, of foreigner’s lack of 
understanding of Rwanda among other things. Does the attempted creation 
of a ‘Rwandaness’ (and suppression of Tutsi-Hutu-Twa identities) rely on, or 
utilise, this vilified ‘foreigner’? Historically state-building elsewhere has 
unquestionably utilised an idea of ‘foreigner’ or ‘other’ or common enemy as 
a uniting factor for nation building.  
 
We know some within the international community now criticise Kagame for 
lack of democratic governance whilst others heap praise on the economic and 
social achievements post-genocide. In his paper David says that it was surprising 
that the Habyarimana years were often praised as being a developmental 
success, despite the underlying structural discrimination etc. But Zorbas 2004 
suggests a similar and dangerous situation is occurring now, whereby Kagame’s 
economic achievement is praised in the face of discriminatory practices. 
Reyntjens 2011 in fact says the international community must take a massive (if 
not primary) role in allowing authoritarianism to emerge, which I found a 
somewhat arrogant conclusion which supposes donors could (and should) 
determine how Rwanda is governed if they put more effort in.  
 
 Youth – Des Forges (1999) notes that youth played a big role in the genocide, 
but also that the RPF also recruited youth within Rwanda and had cells with 
military training operating in the country (composed of both Hutu and Tutsi). 
What role is the youth playing now in Rwanda? Particularly these RPF 




 Regional identity – This paper shows how post-independence the viligisation 
policies meant that certain regions became associated with particular 
ethnicities. We need to assess how that manifests now? 
 Perpetrators – I thought it was interesting that Buckley-Zistel 2006 says that 
lots of people who were jailed for killings can cause problems when they are 
freed and return home. They are often shocked to see people living side-by-
side in relative harmony, still harbouring their own resentments. What is the 
role of such people? Can they be included somehow/ignored/transformed etc 
as part of the state-building process? 
 
Politics of elections 
  
 Electoral system – Stroh (2010) says that the Proportional Representation 
system in use in Rwanda (to elect a certain number of parliamentarians) 
provides the illusion of democracy but is in fact used as its easier to control 
and fake, allowing a token amount of opposition candidates in whilst 
maintaining RPF control.  
 Exclusion – the perceived dominance of the RPF (if seen as ‘Tutsi) and 
marginalisation of others (‘Hutu’) can stoke resentment. Jacobs 2010 worries 
that a system of exclusion can create a troubling idea that Tutsi’s cant be 
trusted in politics, which was a primary thought/motivator during the 
genocide.  
 Women – Rwanda has been praised for the number of women in parliament 
and government; but Burnet 2008 suggests there is actually a paradox of 
more women being present but that they lack genuine power. She argues that 
people at the grassroots never really understood the idea of Women’s 
Councils in 1998 and the process was driven by elite women; and also that 
the women’s movement has lost some momentum due to many of its leaders 
now becoming incorporated into state politics rather than leading civil 
society ventures. Burnet is positive, however, that in the long term the 
presence of women will have an extremely positive effect. Burnet also praises 
Rwandan women for skilfully operating within whatever political system 
they have been faced with, recognising authoritarianism but making gains 
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within it. This began under Habyarimana where Women’s civil society groups 
did operate and effect some policies, and the same now occurs under 
Kagame. Note that interestingly, Gready 2010 counters that women had no 








1. Identity and reconstruction of “ideas of identity” are at the core of 
Rwanda’s nation- and statebuilding conversation. 
2. Initial political settlement paid less attention to on-going forms of 
[identity based] exclusion within Rwandan society 
3. There is some return to the conversations that led to civil war and 
genocide but there is some transmutation in issues and actors 
4. Gender relationships transmutated through the historical periods from 
gendered participation to exclusion and later to shared leadership.  
 
 
 
 
